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‘A THINGY WORLD’: IRIS MURDOCH’S STUFF
the eagerness of objects to
be what we are afraid to do
cannot help but move us [. . .]
Art, said Victor Shklovsky, exists ‘to make the stone stony’. is is a view of
the function of art to which Iris Murdoch’s ﬁction assents: the stone’s essential
stoniness must be recognized, and respected; objects must be allowed, as she
said, to have ‘all a life and being of their own, and friendliness and rights’.
In , and inﬂuenced by Jean-Paul Sartre’s distinction between être-en-soi
and être-pour-soi, she wrote: ‘Man lives amongst a world of things, alien
[and] senselessly contingent’. However, in the course of her career this sense
of alienation from the material world dissipated, and she increasingly came
to associate the world of objects with the positive aspects of the contingent:
the messy, the ‘hole and corner’, the marginal, the indeterminate, and the
free—those aspects of life which were so important to her literary and philo-
sophical outlook. As she said late on in her life, to Harry Weinberger: ‘how
nice objects are—I’m glad we live in a thingy world’. Murdoch’s novels are
full of things: sometimes things that make things happen, such as Julian’s
new boots in e Black Prince that catalyse an erotic crisis; sometimes things
that sustain an illusion of a coherent self, such as Priscilla’s precious objects,
whose absence suddenly and catastrophically renders her paralysed and des-
 Frank O’Hara, ‘Interior (with Jane?)’, in e Collected Poems of Frank O’Hara, ed. by Donald
Allen (New York: Knopf, ), p. .
 Victor Shklovsky, ‘Art as Technique’, in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, trans. by Lee
T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, ), pp. – (p. ).
 Iris Murdoch, e Philosopher’s Pupil (London: Viking, ), p. .
 In Being and Nothingness () Sartre distinguishes être-en-soi (being in itself) from être-
pour-soi (being-for-itself) as two diﬀerent conditions of existence, and of human subjectivity,
which can be understood as the distinction between the being-of-things and the being-of-persons.
 Iris Murdoch, Sartre, Romantic Rationalist () (New York: Viking, ), p. .
 Iris Murdoch, An Accidental Man () (London: Vintage, ), p. .
 For Murdoch, objects’ particularity, rather than their unspeciﬁcity, was key. Acknowledging
the particularity of things is how one respects their contingency. Elaine Freedgood has recently
given us the idea of the metonymic reading as a way to uncover the supposedly marginal object in
the novel: metonymy can, she suggests, act as a Trojan Horse for contingency. See her introduction
to e Ideas in ings: Fugitive Meaning in the Victorian Novel (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, ). David Trotter has also identiﬁed objects as having an aﬃnity and complicity with
contingency, as he writes about ‘a mutually deﬁning collision between a person and an object’, an
encounter which necessarily ﬁgures the ‘suspension of the mind’s search for signiﬁcance’ (David
Trotter, Cooking with Mud: e Idea of Mess in Nineteenth-Century Art and Fiction (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, ), p. ).
 Quoted in Peter J. Conradi, Iris Murdoch: A Life (London: HarperCollins, ), p. .
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titute. In Murdoch’s novels, there are those who get along with objects, and
those who don’t: those who like the stone for its stoniness, and those who try
to appropriate it, to read it; those who co-opt its stoniness and try to make it
signify. In this way, she suggests we all mistreat things (as Baudrillard writes,
we have always lived oﬀ the ‘splendor of the subject’ and the ‘poverty of the
object’, which is ‘shamed, obscene, passive’).
Murdoch’s work explores and ceaselessly interrogates this attitude, and its
ethical and ontological legitimacy, by contesting conventional hierarchies of
subjects and objects. As she wrote in e Sovereignty of Good, ‘Art invigor-
ates us by a juxtaposition [. . .] of pointlessness and value’. Her novels
consistently emphasize these contraries in order to highlight their ethical
precariousness. To appreciate the discarded details of life is to be capable
of looking at the apparently meaningless without trying to make it mean
something, an attitude distinguished by a sort of cheerful, sympathetic lack
of interest towards the stuﬀ of the world, an attitude that enables an observer
to consider objects benignly with what Steven Connor has described as ‘a ge-
nial, slightly stoned amazement’. is sort of epistemological contentment
is problematized by, among other things, the mutual transformative powers
of looking and being looked at. As M. F. Simone Roberts argues in her recent
essay on Murdoch and Luce Irigaray, ‘perception [is] a cultivated activity,
consciously developed for the sake of the other: it is an intention’. is
enveloping of the material world into one’s subjective perceptual range, the
attempt to put our surroundings to use, for Murdoch is dangerous, because it
threatens to collapse the whole world into a projection of ego. Her exemplary
characters instead exercise a recognition and appreciation of the alterity of
things, of their ontological integrity and separateness. Murdoch’s objects are
therefore an ethical fact that her characters must conjure with: an awareness
of alterity comes to constitute a way of being in the world, an ethical mode
that willingly accommodates diﬀerence, and is capable of surprise at the very
‘thinginess’ of things. Bill Brown’s description of the function of objects in
ﬁction—as a lesson in how we ‘use[ ] objects to make meaning, to make or
re-make ourselves, to organize our anxieties and aﬀections, to sublimate our
fears and shape our fantasies’—will therefore be worth keeping in mind, but
so will the converse: how Murdoch, through her characters, would have us
 Jean Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies (London: Pluto, ), p. .
 Iris Murdoch, e Sovereignty of Good () (London: Routledge, ), p. .
 ‘What is So Bad about Phenomenology?’ <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/english/skc/cp/sobad.htm>
[accessed  November ].
 ‘Messy is Flourishing is Sublime’, in Iris Murdoch and the Moral Imagination (Jeﬀerson, NC:
McFarland, ), pp. – (p. ). For an exploration of how the act of looking at an object
is inextricable from acting upon it in some way see James Elkins, e Object Stares Back: On the
Nature of Seeing (New York: Simon & Schuster: ), p. .
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not use them. is essay, then, will look at two of Murdoch’s novels, e
Black Prince () and e Sea, the Sea (), and argue that, in each, the
objects in the text oﬀer us a new perspective on some of her most signiﬁcant
ideas. It will examine how the relationship between the subject and the object
in her ﬁction is negotiated, arguing that through the attention paid to the ma-
terial world, these novels formulate a theory of forgiveness, or an examination
of ‘the light by which human things can be mended’. Non-human things
emerge as her exemplar of how to suspend destructive, and all too human,
emotion, and provoke the desire articulated by Steven Connor as ‘the instinct
[. . .] to secede from the party of the ﬁrst person and cross over to the side of
things’.
In e Black Prince Priscilla, the sister of the ‘patently misguided’ narrator
Bradley Pearson, is deﬁned by her pathetic attachment to objects, an attach-
ment that is elided with her own objectiﬁcation. Priscilla has been separated
from her ‘precious things’, things ‘to which she seemed to attach an almost
magical signiﬁcance’ (p. ), and whose loss has caused her much agony (‘I
do want them so, they’re the only things I’ve got, I haven’t got anything else, I
haven’t anything else in the world, I feel they’re calling out to me’, pp. –).
Her missing of them, we intuit, is excessive—a sign of her instability and
radical aloneness. In Freudian terms, this excessive attachment is libidinal:
Priscilla’s objects have become metonymic for her sexual being. Her fate is
preﬁgured by this transgressive attachment to things (as David Trotter com-
ments, ‘libidinal transcendence of an object’s commodity-status rarely proves
anything other than a delusion’) Priscilla’s speciﬁc delusion is connected to
her sexual gratuitousness: suddenly untethered by both possessions (and as a
separated wife, her ownership of these things is consistently disputed legally)
and desire, she is wanted by no one, and she becomes an object of repulsion
for Bradley. In this untethering she is suddenly prone to a sort of shiing sub-
jectivity, whereby she becomes profoundly transferable: shunted from person
to person in a literal sense, she is also vulnerable to others’ perception. It is
in the light of Bradley’s reductive pity, annoyance, guilt, and disgust that he
presents her, as he says, as ‘crippled and diminished by my perception itself ’
 Bill Brown, A Sense of ings: e Object Matter of American Literature (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, ), p. .
 Iris Murdoch, e Black Prince (London: Penguin, ), p. .
 Steven Connor, ‘inking ings’ <http://www.stevenconnor.com/thinkingthings> [accessed
 November ], an extended version of a plenary lecture given at the th annual conference of
the European Society for the Study of English (ESSE), Aarhus, Denmark,  August , and as
the Textual Practice lecture, University of Sussex,  October .
 Gillian Dooley, ‘Iris Murdoch’s Use of First-Person Narrative in e Black Prince’, English
Studies,  (), – (p. ).
 David Trotter, ‘Household Clearances in Victorian Fiction’, : Interdisciplinary Studies in
the Long Nineteenth Century,  (): Victorian Fiction in the Material Imagination <http://
www..bbk.ac.uk/index.php//article/view/> [accessed  November ].
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(p. ). She has stopped functioning as a signifying, conscious subject, and
been reduced to a gentle, suﬀering, thing.
is instability of objectiﬁed subjects is replicated and reversed in e Sea,
the Sea, where subjectivity can be located within objects. Animals are ﬁgured
as occupying a liminal space somewhere between subjects and objects: a re-
pository for the same innocence and lack of agency as friendly objects, they
maintain an ability to engage with the world, albeit in an entirely opaque way.
Charles is always fascinated by, and kind to, animals. He ‘was utterly horriﬁed’
to mistake what turns out to be a ‘most engaging toad’ for some sort of large,
ﬂeshy spider. Aer rescuing the toad, Charles reﬂects: ‘How can such gentle
defenceless animals survive?’ (p. ). Animals inspire the same pathos as do
objects, but also a kind of unknowing wonder: they possess the same fealty
to being; they are not self-reﬂexive, but instead deeply ontologically content,
and therefore profoundly gentle; they do not seek to control the world in the
way that humans, with their all-conquering egos, do. In ﬁguring objects as
animals, Murdoch shows us that this gentle faithfulness to being, the replete-
ness of animals, is also present and loveable in objects: ‘my lovely big ugly
vase [. . .] had fallen on the ﬂoor and was broken into a great many pieces.
[. . .] I liked the poor ugly thing, it was like an old dog’ (p. ). And Titus,
who ‘returned like a dog to prove where its home was’ (p. ) aer his death,
leaves his ‘little plastic bag with his treasures, his tie and the cuﬀ-links and
the love poems of Dante’ which ‘was still lying in the corner of the bookroom
like an abandoned dog’ (p. ).
Dog-like fealty is embarrassing in its transparency; dogs do not dissemble
or conceal: Lizzie ‘looked at [Charles] so attentively, so humbly, like a dog
reading its master’s tiniest movements’ (p. ). Hartley is always ﬁgured
‘like an animal’ (p. ) or ‘like an obedient dog’ (p. ), and when she
cries we are constantly made aware of her otherness by Charles’s descrip-
tion of her inhuman, animalistic wails. Murdoch uses animal metaphors as
a staging-post for the ‘thingiﬁcation’ of certain characters, notably Priscilla
and Hartley, who then become transferable as part of an economy where
subjects and objects are constantly displacing each other: Priscilla’s consistent
identiﬁcation, for instance, with the ornamental water buﬀalo, which starts as
a ‘precious object’, but whose use and worth become degraded by its constant
transference between various characters, so that it ﬁnally breaks and becomes
a useless ‘thing’. Equally, Hartley’s depiction as animalistic slowly gives way
to her status in the text as inanimate token; she is ‘a wreck, a poor broken
twig’ (p. ). Titus, her son, recognizes this, and resists it, as he says: ‘I’m
not going to return her, as you put it. She’s not a bottle’ (p. ), and ‘Mary
[Hartley] was being treated like a bit of property or a child’ (p. ). Charles’s
continual objectiﬁcation of Hartley is disguised by his explicit romantic task,
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which is to reﬁnd the subject in the object, or save her from that very process
of thingiﬁcation: ‘What I had seen was a shell, a husk, a dead woman, a dead
thing. Yet this was just the thing I wanted so clearly to reanimate, to cherish’
(p. ). Hartley’s inanimacy is identical with her unknowability, like ‘a thing
senselessly alien’, or as Gillian Dooley puts it, Hartley’s characterization is
an expression of Murdoch’s belief in ‘uncertainty about other people’s feel-
ings and beliefs’ and the ‘opacity and independence of other minds’ (p. ).
e reader is never sure to what extent she feels or knows anything, and it
is this epistemological ambiguity, on both the readers’ and character’s part,
that makes Hartley more authentically real to us even as she becomes less
accessible—as, Murdoch implies, everyone is to everyone else. As she says to
Charles: ‘ “As if you could know anything” ’ (p. ). Authenticity, for Mur-
doch, is equivalent to opacity, and opacity is a quality consistently represented
in both of these novels by things. Identity therefore accrues by a subject’s very
objectness, but this is a model made possible by Murdoch’s understanding of
objects as potentially suﬀused with subjectivity.
Priscilla, who is also ﬁgured as possessing the inﬁnitely transferable pro-
perties of the object, had grown up with her father disapproving of her
‘worldliness’. Worldliness here, we understand, is an almost obscene version
of the ability to extend oneself into an aﬃnity with objects, where possession
becomes a means of submitting oneself to the crassly material world, and one
which has a coarsening eﬀect on that world itself. And yet, when describing
Priscilla’s kitchen, with its ‘horrible modern cutlery’, and the ‘imitation “bar”
in the corner of the drawing room’, Bradley acknowledges objects’ potential
consolatory power: ‘even the stupider vanities of the modern world can have
a kind of innocence, a sort of anchoring steadying quality’. ‘Perhaps’, he even
concedes, ‘some light may fall upon them’ (p. ). is version of possession
as ontological safety-net, or as existential reinforcement—without which one
might, like Priscilla, stop signifying, and become subject to others’ shiing
perceptions, passed around like a token—appears as a largely female aﬄic-
tion; Rachel in e Black Prince complains of her husband, Arnold: ‘His stuﬀ
crawls over everything, he takes away all my things and turns them into his
things’ (p. ). Rachel wants ‘a little privacy, a little secrecy, a few things of my
own which aren’t absolutely dyed and saturated with Arnold’, and ‘I haven’t
any private things. He owns the world. It’s all his, his, his’ (p. ). Murdoch
consistently bemoans on her married women’s behalf the lack of this ‘thing’
of their own, and in doing so articulates the possibility of a relationship with
objects characterized by purity and integrity and which, rather than being
conducted in privacy, comes to constitute that privacy.
Hartley tries to characterize her husband in the same terms: ‘Ben hasn’t any-
one in the world but me. He hasn’t any thing in the world’ (p. ). But this
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sense of possession as ballast, where our objects can bolster us up, and tether
us down, is read diﬀerently by Ben. He instead rages at the disloyalty of his
possessions, which conspire to tell a diﬀerent story about his life from the one
he recognizes: ‘All this bloody house we took so much trouble with, the bloody
furniture, the garden, these fucking roses, pretence, pretence, pretence, I’d like
to smash it all to pieces’ (p. ). Ben’s view of his and Hartley’s life as at a dis-
junction with the objects that constitute it is reinforced by Charles: ‘Nibletts,
its roses, its horrible new carpets, the brass ornaments, the lurid curtains, the
bell, impressed me not at all, these were gauzy, visionary’ (pp. –). e
‘stuﬀ’ of their life together is socially constituted, but also, crucially, in a less
authentic and less solidly material way than his. is is a Charlesean snobbery
at work, of course—their stuﬀ is faking it in the social sense—but the objects
are also faking it physically: they are ‘gauzy, visionary’, simulacra of objects.
By casting into speculation their ontological integrity, Charles renders the
objects uncanny. e listing of domestic ephemera dissects the essential opti-
mism of the things, and proleptically assesses the misprision of this optimism:
like Julian’s dustpan and brush in e Black Prince, they are objects bought
to construct a future, to simultaneously embody the hopes that they have for
their lives and performatively to constitute those hopes.
Murdoch’s frequent use of the listing of objects marks her interest in the su-
perﬂuous, redundant details of life, and simultaneously subverts the notion of
that redundancy. When Bradley ine Black Prince ﬁrst sees Julian’s balloon,
which has been cut loose from its string, he says: ‘I watched it coming toward
me like an errant moon, mysterious, invisible to all but myself, the bearer of
some potent as yet unfathomed destiny. I wanted it’ (p. ). is liberat-
ing gratuitousness of objects, whose ﬂirtatiousness provokes our possessive
desire—‘I watched it coming toward me [. . .] I wanted it’—is contrasted with
the real ballast of people’s lives (other people) and their weighty, oppressive
determinism: as Rachel laments in the same novel, ‘my life is all compulsory.
My child, my husband, compulsory’ (p. ).
As well as being the materials through which these versions of our lives
are constructed literally, objects also construct a version of our lives by being
passive witnesses to it. is sense of being accompanied through life by our
possessions converts them into a type of externalized memory bank: for many
of us, our things are the only witnesses to vast swathes of our lives; they
become, in Peter Schwenger’s phrase, custodians of memory. He writes:
For many, the familiar presence of things is a comfort. ings are valued not only
because of their rarity or cost of their historical aura, but because they seem to partake
of our lives; they are domesticated, part of our routine and so of us. eir long associ-
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ation with us seems to make them custodians of our memories; so that sometimes, as
in Proust, things reveal us to ourselves in profound and unexpected ways.
Without your objects, you, and what has happened to you, and even what is
going to happen to you, might cease to have any reality—as in Priscilla’s crisis
of subjectivity precipitated by her lost objects. Charles’s relationship with his
house also mines this nostalgic seam:
I felt by now that I was getting to know its oddities and I was more friendly towards
it. It was not exactly a sinister or menacing eﬀect, but as if the house was a sensitized
plate which intermittently registered things which had happened in the past. (p. )
is sense of a house as an authority on one’s life appeals to the same instinct:
as Ben, and Charles, intuit, our possessions are necessarily truth-tellers: as
Frank O’Hara pointed out in the poem quoted at the head of this essay, their
ability to exist fearlessly has an ontological integrity that we cannot help but
feel judges us, and any of our attempts to be what we are not. is can feel
like a threat to the ability to act as an agent in one’s own life, and in this sense
objects collude with stasis: as Charles suddenly realizes, to act in the way
that he wants to, ‘there must be no more witnesses’ (p. ), where witnesses
include one’s possessions both sinister and friendly.
Bradley in e Black Prince is from the start established as someone whose
life is deﬁned by possession. He is an archetypal Murdochian male wielder of
power, fastidious and self-regarding. His disdain for things that are not ‘his’
is instantly established as metonymic for his disdain for people: ‘Trains in-
duce such terrible anxiety. ey image the possibility of total and irrevocable
failure. ey are also dirty, rackety, packed with strangers, an object lesson in
the foul contingency of life’ (p. ). Trains are obvious models for promiscu-
ous human engagement, for intimacy and similitude with arbitrarily selected
members of society. Bradley retreats into a world of objects-as-possessions
to inoculate himself against people (in this, as in other things, he contrasts
with Arnold, who tells us ‘Disapproving of things is alright. But you mustn’t
disapprove of people’, p. ). Bradley tells us that he ‘amass[es] rather than
collect[s]’ (p. ) bric-a-brac and ornaments, and prides himself on his taste
in his selection of them. To ‘amass’ is to engage in a modest form of object
possession, one which implies a cheerful anti-fastidiousness, without the hint
of repulsion that collection must entail; collecting means picking things care-
fully, the exercising of taste: this we do want, this we do not. However, it
becomes clear that Bradley, like Charles in e Sea, the Sea, is not adequate
to the ethical integrity of the amasser. Charles describes his cousin James’s
terrifying inability to exercise discrimination, an inability which marks him
 Peter Schwenger, e Tears of ings: Melancholy and Physical Objects (Minneapolis and
London: University of Minnesota Press, ), p. .
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out as an authentic amasser: ‘He seems to have no conception of how to sort or
arrange his possessions, they are dumped and piled rather than arranged, and
elegant objets d’art are juxtaposed with the merest oddments of the bazaar’
(p. ). James is in fact, if not an exemplary Murdochian saint, one who is
closest to ‘good’ of anyone in the novel, and his powers are centred on his
control of the inanimate: ‘he had’, Charles tells us, ‘a sort of uncanny instinct
about things’ (p. ); ‘When the ball got lost it was James who found it; and
he once instantly recovered an old toy aeroplane of mine simply on the basis
of my having told him I had lost it’ (p. ). Such an aﬃnity with objects
transgresses the strict object/subject hierarchy of the collector—‘His presence
in the house would change everything, even the kettle’ (p. )—and replaces
it with the subordination of oneself to the material stuﬀ of the world of the
happy amasser, an object-subject among subject-objects.
Peter Schwenger describes collection as exemplary of possession (which is
itself exemplary object-interaction according to Walter Benjamin, who says,
ownership is ‘the most intimate relationship that one can have to things’
and suggests that collections allow objects to talk to each other—associations
sparked or diﬀerences highlighted by proximity). For Bradley, his posses-
sions are identical with his self, and his collecting has a sort of fastidious and
yet extravagant gratuitousness that is, like himself, primarily narcissistic and
melancholic. Collectors, and collections, are always melancholy, because of
their pathetic longing towards completion, a completion which would negate
their purpose and thus, perhaps, their existence. Symbolically, completing a
collection is tantamount to death. As Jean Baudrillard notes, ‘the acquisition
of the ﬁnal item would in eﬀect denote the death of the subject’. If ﬁnish-
ing a collection is equivalent to death, and because melancholy, by Freudian
deﬁnition, prolongs itself interminably to avoid the acceptance of death, col-
lecting is melancholic in its refusal to live a normal, temporal pattern—in its
refusal to stop—and subversive in its implicit rejection of death. Collecting,
and its representative textual activity, listing, are both about a simultaneous
capaciousness and stinginess; listing performs presence, but with a subtextual
acknowledgement of what is missing, and a proleptic desire for what is not
yet included. Both are constantly preoccupied with both pleasure and its de-
ferral; if the ideal collection is one that is never ﬁnished, we might read it as
 Walter Benjamin, ‘Unpacking my Library’ (), in Selected Writings, .: –, ed.
by Michael W. Jennings and others (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ), pp. –
(p. ).
 Jean Baudrillard, ‘e System of Collecting’, in e Cultures of Collecting , ed. by John Elsner
and Roger Cardinal (London: Reaktion, ), pp. – (p. ).
 See Sigmund Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (), in e Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. by James Strachey and others,
: On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology, and Other Works
(London: Penguin, ), pp. –.
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inﬁnite postponement of the climax—a luxuriation in languor, or a continual
concession to frustration.
e distinction articulated in both novels between those who collect and
those who amass is in a sense a metaphor for Murdoch’s own narrative neur-
oses, as she customarily vacillated between the need for untruthful, selective
form, and the mess of (or amassed) reality that she wanted faithfully to gesture
towards. ese two diﬀering narratological approaches could be summed up
rather broadly as description versus narration. e sudden damming of the
narrative and diversion into the descriptive, with its customary recourse to the
object-list, has the eﬀect of constructing a literary still life. Rosemary Lloyd
has described how intricate descriptions of objects can create a linguistic still
life that stands alone, independent of the plot, ‘but that also reﬂects back on
the novel itself by focusing on the power of observation and on how complex,
indeed sometimes impossible, it is to note perfectly everything that surrounds
us’. Lloyd assents to the basic contrast that it emphasizes, and suggests that
‘the still life inserted into a novel or short story tends to be overlooked, swept
aside in modes of reading that diﬀerentiate prose from poetry, privileging
plot over detail’ (pp. –).
Both novels under discussion here abound with these sorts of narrative
gaps. In e Sea, the Sea, when Charles enters James’s ﬂat for the ﬁrst time,
he says that ‘the scene must be listed rather than described’, and the ensuing
object-list goes on for nearly two pages. In e Black Prince, when Bradley
visits Arnold and Rachel in the throes of the initial crisis of the novel, he
‘noticed broken glass, broken china, a stain on the carpet’. Nothing is ful-
ﬁlling its remit as an object; everything is broken or ruined. is inadequacy
of objects is everywhere: tapestries are ‘pseudo’, modern lithographs are ‘bad’
(p. )—nothing just is, it exists in a state of perpetual failure. Bradley’s need
to impose his taste on the objects that come into his perceptual ﬁeld infects
the early descriptive passages of the novel, and what ﬁrst appears like an
unsentimental, descriptively objective laying-bare of a home is in fact a facet
of his inability to see with sympathy, where disgust is inspired not by the
failure of the objects but by no less than his dissatisfaction with the life that
is lived among these objects. at everything that Bradley sees is broken or
failing is indicative of the perceptual ‘falling-short’ that Schwenger describes;
Bradley does not understand the existence of these things, because he has no
sympathy with the life that has occasioned them; the objects have become
things in their uselessness.
e list, or description, eﬀects the disappearance of event from narrative:
nothing happens in these still lifes. When narration gives way to description,
 Rosemary Lloyd, Shimmering in a Transformed Light: Writing the Still Life (Ithaca, NY, and
London: Cornell University Press, ), p. .
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things are therefore excavated of use, rendered gratuitous and textually static.
is is key to the distinction between an object and a thing as elaborated
by theorists of object studies: ‘We begin to confront the thingness of ob-
jects when they stop working for us: when the drill breaks, when the car
stalls, when the windows get ﬁlthy, when their ﬂow within the circuits of
production and distribution, consumption and exhibition, has been arrested,
however momentarily’ (Brown, p. ). An object is useful to us, it slots in to
our perceptual ﬁeld, but when something breaks, or ceases to make sense,
it becomes a thing: slightly alien, slightly uncanny: ‘What is this thing?’ we
ask, in incomprehension. Bradley’s encounters with objects that have been
excavated of utility and meaning are deﬁned by this incomprehension: when
he puts his hand in his pocket, ‘my hand encountered [. . .] an object which
my ﬁngers were unable to “read” ’. It is Hartley’s hair-slide: ‘I stared at the
almost senseless little thing and tried to grasp it as an omen, but it just looked
pathetic and ﬁlled me with sadness and I put it away in a drawer’ (p. ).
e ‘senselessness’ of the object renders it a ‘thing’. Similarly, the letter and
the stone Hartley leaves behind her when she disappears for the ﬁnal time
provoke uncertainty: ‘Why did she keep the letter, even though she did not
read it? Why did she put the stone into the garden where I’d be sure to see
it?’ (p. ). ese objects’ failure is one of signiﬁcation; language cannot
quite grasp them in their obduracy: they are a letter and a stone, but they are
also more stubborn than that, representing both a surfeit and an inadequacy
to what their linguistic ‘roles’ imply. is sudden gratuitousness, or objects’
ability to change into extraneous things from the useful and comprehensible
objects they have been previously, adds to the sense of a sudden pictorial
representation of the inanimate intruding on the narrative. Literary still lifes
present a narrative aporia, and a sudden absence. What has been progressing
temporally, and has been understood causally, suddenly stops and scans itself
spatially: against explanation, these descriptive passages represent what this
space looks like at this exact moment in narrative time. As such they disrupt
the teleology of the narrative, and distance us from the logic of the movement
of the plot: for a moment, nothing happens, it just is.
When Bradley enters Rachel and Arnold’s bedroom, the narrative performs
a similar skip:
e room had the rather sinister tedium which some bedrooms have, a sort of weary
banality which is a reminder of death. A dressing-table can be a terrible thing. [. . .] e
plate glass ‘table’ surface was dusty and covered with cosmetic tubes and bottles and
balls of hair. e chest of drawers had all its drawers gaping, spewing pink underwear
and shoulder straps. e bed was chaotic, violent, the green artiﬁcial silk coverlet
swooping down on one side and the sheets and blankets creased up into a messy
mass, like an old face. ere was a warm intimate embarrassing smell of sweat and
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face powder. e whole room breathed the ﬂat horror of genuine mortality, dull and
spiritless and ﬁnal. (p. )
is is not the desire-inducing vacancy of Shakespeare’s Cleopatra—an ab-
sent presence at the heart of Enobarbus’s encomium—but the disgusted ana-
tomism of Swi’s Celia, whose cosmetic clutter evokes only to revoke a purely
artiﬁcial beauty. Rachel, the occupant of the bed, is notably absent from this
passage, though everywhere her human detritus, ‘creased up into a messy
mass’, delineates her presence. e cruelty inherent in this passage is striking,
lacking any human, sympathetic generosity or objectivity: the bed, and by
metonymic extension its occupant, is ‘chaotic, violent’ because it, and she, oc-
casion disgust in the observer. Georg Lukács argues that description ‘debases
character to the level of inanimate objects’. Here, the excess of metonymy
is oﬀered to the reader as a sort of obscene titillation. As Jean Laplanche and
Serge Leclaire point out, metonymy is a marker of desire since, they argue,
its ‘inexhaustible power of displacement [. . .] is made precisely to mark the
gap through which desire originates and into which it perpetually plunges’.
Sexual disgust is driven in the same way that sexual desire is: by absence;
and that gap, of displacement, is here revealed by the almost pornographic
metonymy that is listed and catalogued for our appraisal: ‘gaping, spewing
pink’.
Metonymy functions as the means by which things are rendered alien, by
their sudden proximation to a subject, but also, as noted, to import desire.
Julian, the focus of Bradley’s love and lust in e Black Prince, is oen sur-
rounded bymetonymic constructions and other associations with objects. Her
entrance into Bradley’s consciousness as anything other than a child of his
friends is occasioned by a transgression of the conventional understanding of
the relation between people and objects, when she asks to buy the small water
buﬀalo that he treasures, to which Bradley replies blankly ‘what?’ She answers
him, ‘this little thing. I wonder if I could buy it? Would you sell it to me?’ At
this point her mother interjects ‘Julian, you can’t ask people to sell you their
belongings!’ (p. ). Female body parts are oen characterized as disembodied
‘things’ by the narrator, and Julian in particular is represented synecdochally
by various legs, shoes, boots, and feet. At the moment of Bradley’s revelation
of love, Julian tucks her feet up under her, encased by tights; he buys her knee-
length boots, which act as his ﬁrst (still unconscious) arousal (‘e black-clad
girl began to ease the purple boot on over Julian’s foot and my grey nylon
sock. e high boot enveloped her leg and the zip fastener moved slowly
 Georg Lukács, ‘Narrate or Describe’ (), in ‘Writer and Critic’ and Other Essays, trans. by
Arthur Kahn (London: Merlin Press, ), pp. – (p. ).
 Jean Laplanche and Serge Leclaire, e Unconscious and the Id: A Volume of Laplanche’s
‘Problématiques’, trans. by Luke urston with Lindsay Watson (London: Rebus Press, ) p. .
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upward’, p. ); and he urgently repeats the injunction to ‘describe your cos-
tume’ (p. ), so as to elicit a description of the shiny buckled shoes which,
as Prince Hal, she dons, and which lead to Bradley’s unsettlingly rapacious
sexual epiphany. In the theatre, Bradley describes their ﬁrst physical contact:
‘I cautiously advanced my le shoe up against her right shoe in such a way
that the shoes were contiguous. [. . .] As if one had secretly sent one’s servant
to suborn the servant of the beloved’ (p. ). As he reminisces, ‘Perhaps it
was when she said “Black tights and silvery buckles”. Or perhaps it was when
she took her boots oﬀ. [. . .] And when I had that mystical experience, looking
at her legs in the shoe-shop’ (p. ).
e transference of sexual desire from subjects to objects (and to disarticu-
lated body parts) and back again marks dysfunction, impotence, and Bradley’s
increasing awareness of his mortality. is mingling of desire and mortality
is palpable throughout e Black Prince. Rachel’s material traces deﬁne her
metonymically, but they are also ‘traces’ because the subtext of the scene is
one of ‘genuine mortality’—‘Are her traces all that is le?’, we must ask. e
scene is autopsic in its cataloguing of intimate human dirt laid bare. Mikhail
Bakhtin wrote about the sudden shi that renders the stuﬀ of the world alien
to us, and warns of its power to reach back and alter the observing subject:
at which in life, in cognition, in deed we call a speciﬁc object acquires its speciﬁcity,
its proﬁle only in our relationship to it: our relationship deﬁnes the object and its
structure, but not the reverse; only where the relationship becomes random from our
side, as it were capricious, only when we retreat from our authentic relationship to
things and to the world, does the speciﬁcity of the object confront us as something
alien and independent; it begins to decompose, and we ourselves succumb to the power
of the random, we lose ourselves, and we lose as well the stable deﬁnitiveness of the
world.
Our sudden alienation from things is what brings about their decomposi-
tion, and our instability as a subject. Rosemary Lloyd has argued that still
lifes have decay and decomposition as an essential part: a still-life painting,
just like a literary work, both immortalizes the piece of fruit or the leaf and
draws attention to even the inanimate’s mortality and profound susceptibility
to change through time, like the stone that gathers moss, or the cliﬀ that
erodes—or indeed, the sheet which, through its textual dissection, is shown
to have accretions of sweat-stains, creases, and pathos in equal measure.
is pathos is felt at the moment of metonymy’s sleight-of-hand displace-
ment. Peter Schwenger argues that ‘there is a melancholy associated with
physical objects’:
 Mikhail Bakhtin, quoted in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. by Caryl Emerson
(Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, ), p. xliii.
 See ‘Time and Space’, in Lloyd, Shimmering in a Transformed Light, pp. –.
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e melancholy I am speaking of [. . .] is generated by the act of perception, perception
of the object by the subject. is perception, always falling short of full possession,
gives rise to a melancholy that is felt by the subject and that is ultimately for the
subject. (Schwenger, pp. –)
Schwenger identiﬁes things’ ultimate indiﬀerence to the self as lying at the
heart of their consolatory power, and connects our desire for the inanimate
with the desire to return to the inanimate to the inanimate which Freud
described as the death-drive; the self may lie under our performative selves,
in darkness: ‘What is lost is not the object but our own prior state of ob-
jecthood’ (p. ). is sense of loss is echoed by the melancholy induced by
the ‘falling-short’ of our possession of them, a melancholy that is for the self
and its limitations. Objects show us the edges of our ﬁeld of inﬂuence on the
world. ere is always a surplus that eludes us, which Schwenger describes:
the ‘sense-organs betray a shortfall, a falling short of full comprehension.
Sight, touch, hearing, smell, taste—none of these is comprehensive in itself;
each uses its own language of sense to speak of the object’ (p. ). All de-
scriptions and paintings of objects are in a sense a product of this perceptual
inadequacy; we want to understand these alien things, and our incapacity is
a source of loss. is melancholy may also be entwined with envy, of course:
as in O’Hara’s poem, the fealty to being itself, at which objects are naturally
skilled (and at which we are not, with our burden of self-consciousness), is
both reassuring or disturbing, admirable and pathos-inducing; we may envy
objects or pity them.
And yet Murdoch’s insistence on the ethical dimension of our apprehen-
sion of the material world is key, as it is formative in the way that people
can come to accommodate the opacity of the world and the crucial alterity
of both things and people that Murdoch’s ﬁction and philosophy both so
consistently emphasize. is pity is not necessarily an appropriation or her-
meneutic perversion of the object, but a version of sympathy, one present
in Murdoch’s more generous narrators. An ability to render things kindly
in their dignity and integrity is the lesson that both Charles and Bradley, to
diﬀering degrees, learn throughout the course of these two novels. Charles’s
‘pity for her need not be a device or an impertinence, it can survive as a blank
ignorant quiet unpossessive souvenir’ (p. ). is pity is itself ﬁgured as a
‘thing’, with a thing’s ability to be blank and unpossessive. Charles ﬁgures his
emotions as a friendly object: a ‘souvenir’. A souvenir is, as Susan Stewart has
commented, ‘an object arising out of the necessarily insatiable demands of
nostalgia’. Souvenirs are objects imbued with memory and signiﬁcance, ob-
jects whose status as custodians of memory has been brought to our attention;
 Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the
Collection (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, ), p. .
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they are metonymic of experience, or as Stewart says, we ‘desire souvenirs
of [. . .] events whose materiality has escaped us, events that thereby only
exist through the invention of narrative’ (p. ). But if Hartley’s memory
is ﬁgured as a souvenir, it is because she herself has escaped narrative, and
possession. e souvenir may promise to speak to us of meaning, but at the
last, it resists.
Charles’s pity for objects in e Sea, the Sea remains essentially interven-
tionist, even at the end: ‘It does matter, every little tiny thing matters and must
be found again andmust be picked up andmust be redeemed’ (p. ). Charles
resists the text’s version of enlightenment (unlike Bradley: as Elizabeth Dipple
writes, ‘in no other book has [Murdoch] taken a character so far, from irritat-
ing inadequacy to the absolute of art and thence to death’, and other critics,
including Gillian Dooley, have assented to this view of Bradley). ings
can be redeemed, but not through our control, our ‘picking up’ of them, but
through our cessation of control. is cessation of control, or the love that
Murdoch believes we must have for other people, is articulated through our
respect for their alterity, which is equivalent to moral goodness. Murdoch
criticism has generally agreed on the complex intertwining of these categories
in her work, and I would add that objects, bothe Sea, the Sea ande Black
Prince imply, are, and should be, our dominant model of how to love, and
of how to be; objects are Murdoch’s governing metaphor and her exemplary
ontological ﬁgure. Peter Schwenger writes that: ‘Objects have a [. . .] vivid and
indiﬀerent presence that sets oﬀ by contrast the perceiver’s amorphous being,
along with the very opposite of indiﬀerence: a kind of longing towards some-
thing that continuously recedes into dimensions of loss’ (p. ). is longing
towards us from objects also, in these two novels, is replicated in the opposite
direction: it is the longing to attain the condition of objecthood—we are, says
James ine Sea, the Sea, ultimately no more than ‘fake objects’ (p. ).
at something skipped over, glanced at, or discarded can be retrieved,
accommodated, recuperated; that space can be made, and will eventually be
made, for all the things of our lives: this fantasy is identical with the medi-
tation on the degree to which we are forgivable that is at the heart of both
of these novels. Objects forgive us by their ultimate indiﬀerence to us, their
inoculation against the perils of ego, and of emotion. e ‘love’ that Murdoch
identiﬁes as a moral good is not necessarily human love: rather, it is the
love that objects show us is possible; love with the messy human emotion
extracted—or love-in-itself and for-itself, as Sartre might have said. As Brad-
ley Pearson concludes: ‘Forgiveness is oen thought of as an emotion. It is
not that. It is rather a certain kind of cessation of emotion’ (p. ). In this
 Elizabeth Dipple, Iris Murdoch: Work for the Spirit (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
), p. .
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sense our objects are doing their metonymic duty and are again standing in
loyally for our selves. As Loxias writes in the closing lines ofe Black Prince,
art is ‘the light by which human things can be mended’ (p. ). ‘Human
things’ is of course paradoxical: if they are human, they are also very much
things; our messes, our materiality, or our attachments, as James from e
Sea, the Sea would call them. Murdoch’s ethical prescription is expressed by,
and formulated in, her theory of how we use, and don’t use, objects; how
we mend, and don’t mend, these ‘things’. ey are redeemable, can be made
meaningful, without imposing on them, or changing them into something
else: they can become part of our lives, the melancholy averted, the thing
made useful—through pity, generosity, and love, like the ‘sea, [that] undoes
all knots’ (p. ).
C U J J
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